Solving the 1st Half of the Problem to get to the 2nd
By Doug Howarth CEO, Hypernomics, Inc.
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A problem well stated is a problem half-solved.— Charles F. Kettering
A few months ago, I wrote about the ill-fated AGM-183A hypersonic missile. While its engineering parameters were well-known, its budget limitations were not. Funded to about $1.7B for its development, Lockheed Martin said its first unit cost would be about $42M. At the same time, the Congressional Budget Office thought the USG would be able to afford 100 of them at their eventual per-unit price of $15M to $18M. As a variation of the chart below revealed (C), the chance of that happening was significantly less than one in one million quadrillion, as that price put it at 108 Standard Deviations past the market’s Upper Demand Frontier. Eventually, budget realism entered the picture, and the United States Air Force stopped funding the program. In the process, it validated their Demand Frontier.
For all the work we spend extending the boundaries of engineering, we must understand that trying to exceed a well-defined Demand Frontier by leaps and bounds never works.
To know what we can do, we must first know what we can’t. That’s part of the 1st half of the problem. The AGM-183A didn’t get past that.
LM did quite a bit better with its stealthy AGM-158B, also known as the JASSM-ER, in (A) below. At the time of the study, it was the most expensive air-to-surface missile in the industry. In the 20 years shown in (C) (1997-2016), LM sold 275 units at an inflation-adjusted 2024 price of $2.5M, with the AGM-158B helping to form the market’s Upper Demand Frontier. Note that that curve is relatively flat, with a slope of -0.533. That meant the USG spent more money on the market’s lower-priced part than its upper bit.
A recent headline noted that Russia knocked down over 150 Ukrainian drones. The ineffectiveness indicates the need for missiles to be invisible to the enemy. Getting smaller and stealthier will help.
Enter the prospect of much smaller, less expensive, and (presumably stealthy) cruise missiles, the air-to-surface (specifically, anti-ship) ordnance proposed by American defense startup Ares Industries shown in (B). Designed to attack smaller vessels, the company has set a target price of $300K per missile. Of course, whether or not they pull this off remains to be seen, but the attempt is admirable, as the low price enables the purchase of up to tens of thousands of units over two decades (C). It would add flexibility in the inventory, letting operators swap expensive devices for cheaper ones when smaller packages can do the job.
In (C), since Glide Bombs cost a fraction (about 1/8 for the same payload*velocity and range) of missiles, planners can afford to buy more of these devices than powered missiles. One could imagine a future in which stealthy glide bombs dropped from unmanned drones would lower operational costs and pilot risk while increasing mission success rates.
